With respect to the United States as a whole, there is an argument that the entire question of marriage and divorce regulation should be subject to a uniform standard, perhaps best achieved at the federal level.
3 Some countries with federal systems do subject marriage and divorce regulation to national treatment. 4 Federal law on these issues would avoid many of the difficulties that arise when parties marry or divorce in one state and then move to another. If a national standard were in place, rights of the marital partners would not be affected by their movement across state lines. 5 Of course, the substance of any "national" standard could go either way in the debate over same-sex marriage. One possible interpretation of the present U.S. Constitution could result in preventing states from classifying marriage as a status reserved for persons of different sexes-that would in effect mean any state providing for the marital relationship would have to make it available to couples regardless of their sexual orientation and would establish a single uniform standard. 6 Alternatively, the recently proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution-which failed to win the two-thirds majority necessary to pass the House and be submitted to the states for ratification-would have restricted marriage to one man and one woman. 7 Such an amendment also creates a national standard on marriage, but would prevent all same-sex marriages. 3 Such uniformity could be achieved through federal legislation and, to a lesser degree, through uniform state laws. There was thought at one time that a constitutional amendment would be necessary to justify federal law on the subject. See James Herbie DiFonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 918 & n.249, 919 (2000) (discussing the interest in federally enforced uniformity for divorce laws in the early twentieth century). For an interesting historical account of the movement for uniform divorce legislation, see James J. White, Ex Proprio Vigore, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2096 REV. , 2106 REV. -28 (1991 . 4 For example, in Germany family law is within the realm of federal law and regulation by the states is preempted. See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] arts. 72, 74; § § 1297-1921 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] . In Australia, federal legislation-the Family Law Act of 1975, the Family Law Reform Act of 1995, and subsequent amendmentsgoverns family law matters. 5 Issues of recognition of such relationships would still arise if the parties move across national boundaries. 6 The analogy is to the Supreme Court's decision in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which held state laws prohibiting interracial marriages to be unconstitutional. 7 Pluralism in the United States has always made national consensus on a variety of family matters difficult. Long before the issue of samesex marriage came to the fore, similar conflict-of-laws issues arose with respect to interracial marriages and the application of miscegenation statutes, 8 as well as over grounds for divorce and the ability to obtain migratory divorces. 9 Historically, issues of family law-marriage, divorce, and custody-have generally been left to the states to establish according to their own community norms. 10 Accordingly, the present landscape allows each state in the United States to make the choice about same-sex marriage (and civil unions and registered domestic partnerships, for that matter) for itself.
11 But because parties in marital relationships often act outside their community or move elsewhere and establish a new home base, other states must address the rights and obligations of the parties to a union that they may have prevented altogether.
12 This Essay offers a normative analysis for these conflictof-laws issues in a fashion that I believe best reflects the needs and values of our federal system, giving genuine respect to the decision made in a relevant community about the desirability of permitting same-sex marriages.
ing his continued support for a ban). 8 17 A same-sex couple from another state that does not permit same-sex marriage-say Pennsylvania-travels to Massachusetts to get married and then returns home to Pennsylvania. How should one view the out-of-state marriage? If one brings a modern conflict-of-laws analysis to bear on this subject, the way to understand the law authorizing same-sex marriage is to view it as a social, moral, and political judgment that affects members of a particular community-i.e., those 13 The Supreme Court of Hawaii, in Baehr v. Lewin (2004) . In Lockyer, the California Supreme Court voided all marriage licenses issued to same-sex couples in contravention of sections 300 and 308.5. The court held that the public officials who issued the licenses exceeded their ministerial authority when they acted on their belief that the statutes were unconstitutional. The opinion also noted, however, that same-sex marriages would be valid if the unconstitutionality was judicially determined. 17 See infra note 37.
individuals who are and will be residing in Massachusetts. When a couple from Pennsylvania-that is, two Pennsylvanians who live in Pennsylvania and who will return to live in Pennsylvania-come to get married in Massachusetts, Massachusetts has little justification for extending its law to them. In conflict-of-laws terminology, Massachusetts has no interest in applying its law to this case. 18 In this situation, there is not only a question of the recognition of the marriage in Pennsylvania, but also whether the Massachusetts rule about same-sex marriage should or constitutionally even could extend to these individuals. The Supreme Court's decision in Phillips Petroleum & Co. v. Shutts 19 suggests that Massachusetts may be constitutionally disabled from applying its law in such a case since it has no policy justification for regulating the capacity of these parties to marry. If, however, same-sex marriage were permitted in the state where the parties were resident or domiciled-or even possibly if there were no impediment to such a marriage in that state-Massachusetts might have reason to extend the "courtesy" of a marriage ceremony to the couple because to do so would not infringe upon the interest of the other state.
Some might argue that the long history and tradition of the "place of celebration" rule could be invoked to reject any argument that applying the law where the marriage takes place is unconstitutional, 20 but
18 Modern conflict-of-laws analysis looks to ascertain a policy or "interest" that is furthered by the application of a particular law to the facts in the case. "Interests" can result because of the state's concern with its residents or domiciliaries or due to its policy of encouraging or discouraging particular activities in the state. However, certain "interests" would not be legitimate interests, such as a Massachusetts interest in attracting marriages to be conducted in-state so as to foster hotel and catering businesses in Massachusetts. if such marriage would be void if contracted in such other jurisdiction, and declares any such marriage null and void. 24 A second statute requires the official issuing a marriage license to a nonresident to be satisfied that the person was "not prohibited from intermarrying by the laws of the jurisdiction where he or she resides." 25 Statutes of this kind reflect a respect by the proposed state of celebration for the genuine regulatory interests and values of the particular community of which the couple is a member. Interestingly, following the decision in Goodridge, the Attorney General of Massachusetts issued an order to municipal clerks in Massachusetts to refrain from issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples from outside Massachusetts. 26 That order was challenged in subsequent litigation, claiming that this was an impermissible discriminatory enforcement scheme.
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In rejecting the challenge, a Massachusetts trial court in Cote-Whitacre v. Department of Public Health noted that the instructions being given to the clerks addressed all marriage impedimentsincluding impediments based on age, consanguinity or affinity, marital status or same-gender status-of couples who reside and intend to continue to reside in other states. 28 Nor was the court persuaded by the argument that it was only in the context of same-sex marriages that Massachusetts began to take interest in the out-of-state evasion marriages The enforcement in Massachusetts, held the court, was uniform and systematic.
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Legislation dealing with the evasion of domiciliary marriage laws is not prevalent in the United States. The Uniform Law Commissioners did propose a Uniform Act on the subject, 30 32 And in the marriage laws of many European countries, it is very common to find provisions to prevent marriages that evade the otherwise appropriate law. 33 In some countries the substantive requirements for contracting a marriage are determined for the parties by the law of their nationalities, or in some cases their habitual residences or domiciles. It is a common requirement that a foreign national or resident present a certificate from the state of origin showing that there are no impediments to the marriage according to the laws of that state. 34 In the specific context of the few countries that permit same-sex marriage, Belgium limits them to those situations where such marriages are allowed by the national law of each partner; 35 and the Netherlands only requires that one of the spouses be a citizen or resident of the Netherlands, but residency requires formal registration. 36 Several provinces in Canada now permit same-sex marriage 37 present there do not appear to be residency requirements or other restrictions, and thus these Canadian provinces may offer havens for nonresidents to obtain a same-sex marriage.
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The fact that a couple has evaded its home state's laws does not necessarily mean that the home state must refuse to confer benefits under its laws to which married persons are entitled. When a couple has contracted an "evasion marriage" and returned to their home state, there may still be reasons for that home state to confer certain benefits of a marriage valid where celebrated-even if the marriage itself would not be valid in the home state. The classic casebook example is In re May's Estate 39 where the New York Court of Appeals conferred upon the spouse a "probate benefit" even though the marriage was not permitted under New York law and the parties could be said to have "evaded" the law of New York. Cases of this type are referred to as involving an "incidental question" because the validity of the marriage is not the direct object of the suit. 40 Rather, what is at stake is a particular benefit under the couple's home state law. At the point in time when the issue in May's Estate arose-thirty-five years after the marriage at issue-the only state with a policy to be furthered was that of New York. It is only because the New York statute was written in terms of "spouse" that the validity of the marriage was the issue at all. The state with the relevant policy in such a situation is New York and New York should be free to decide what relationship qualifies as a "spouse" within the meaning of its statute. The parties in May's Estate had lived in New York as husband and wife for thirty-five years, and it was proper for New York to decide that a party to a marriage valid where celebrated was entitled-after many years of living together as spouses in New York-to the benefits generally accorded to a spouse. 43 At the same time, however, New York should not be required to confer benefits upon parties who "evaded" New York marriage law. A New York court could well decide that it should not encourage evasion of its marriage law, and that this purpose is best achieved by denying benefits even many years later. The basic point here is that a proper conflict-of-laws analysis indicates that the relevant inquiry is for New York-whether through its judges interpreting statutes or the legislature defining the scope of benefits-to decide whether its law conferring particular benefits extends to these parties.
II. THE MOBILE MARRIAGE
A similar principle applies to what I will call the "conflict mobile" situation-that is, a case where the parties are validly married in Massachusetts and only later move to a state that does not permit same-sex marriages.
44 This is not a case where the marriage policies of the state of residence or domicile are evaded. Unlike the situation of marriage evasion, the parties in this scenario comply with the only law that is relevant to their relationship at the time of the marriage. Indeed, many of the principles on which conflict-of-laws principles are formu- 42 In Langan, the plaintiff and the decedent had entered a civil union in Vermont. The existence of this "state sanctioned union" was the basis for the court to distinguish cases in which unmarried persons living together-whether heterosexual or homosexual-were not entitled to benefits under New York wrongful death or probate statutes. Id. at 416; see also Silberman & Wolfe, Private International Law for Family Issues, supra note 2, at 261 n.124 (discussing Langan). 43 In Langan, as in May's Estate, the justification of New York's interest is two-fold. The benefit being conferred is derived from a New York statute and the parties were domiciled in New York. New York's interest in providing the benefit might be lessalthough still constitutional-if nonresident parties domiciled in a state prohibiting same-sex marriage or union had been injured in New York and sought recovery under New York's wrongful death statute. Alternatively, in such a case, the New York courts might look to whether the law of the state of the parties' domicile would recognize the party as a "spouse." See infra Part III (discussing these transient effects). 44 migratory marriages and explaining the rights that should and should not attach to such marriages). I use the term "mobile marriage" rather than "migratory marriage" to avoid confusion with the wellentrenched notion of "migratory divorce," which really is closer to the evasion situation, even though divorce jurisdiction is predicated on a technical finding of domicile.
lated, 45 such as upholding expectations of the parties and respect for the legitimate interests of sister states, support recognition of the marriage relationship and the conferral of benefits that usually accompany that relationship. Those rights may include spousal elective shares, pension benefits, maintenance, property rights, and invocation of marital privilege.
The factors relied upon to shape choice-of-law principlesrelevant polices of both the forum and of other states, the protection of justified expectations, and certainty and predictability-suggest that the applicable choice-of-law rule in these validity-of-marriage cases should be the law of the state where the parties were domiciled at the time of the marriage. 46 Analogies can be found in various conflict-of-laws rules applicable to the marriage relationship. Section 283(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws provides that "[t]he validity of a marriage will be determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage under the principles stated in § 6." 47 And the presumptive reference to the applicable law in subsection (2) 45 The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws lists the following factors as relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971).
46 Both I and others have urged this rule in other writing. See Silberman, Can the Island of Hawaii Bind the World?, supra note 12, at 203-04; see also SCOLES ET AL., supra note 40, § 13.8, at 572 ("As the continuing marriage relationship is undertaken and expectations develop, the state most significantly concerned and related would seem to be the intended family domicile of the parties, in a mobile society, at the time it arises."); Mark Strasser, For Whom Bell Tolls: On Subsequent Domiciles' Refusing to Recognize Same-Sex Marriages, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 339, 341 (1998) (identifying the state of domicile at the time of marriage as the state with the most significant interest in the validity of same-sex marriages).
I use the term "domicile at the time of the marriage" to mean where the parties are resident or domiciled immediately before and immediately after the marriage. More complex scenarios could involve parties who leave their residence/domicile to marry and then to reside in the marriage-celebration state or parties who live in different states before their marriage and perhaps even after the marriage. For purposes of the analysis here, I am using only the "paradigm" case. I also am not focusing on distinctions between "residency" and "domicile. [Vol. 153: 2195 of section 283 is the law "where the marriage was contracted . . . unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage." 48 Comment j to section 283 observes that such policies are likely to be those of a state "where at least one of the spouses was domiciled at the time of the marriage and where both made their home immediately thereafter." 49 As regards the "incidents" of the marriage, section 284 of the Restatement (Second) refers back to the provisions of section 283. 50 Other provisions of the Second Restatement adopt a similar rule. In determining the property rights of spouses in movables acquired during the marriage, section 258 of the Restatement (Second) points to the law of the state where the spouses were domiciled at the time of the marriage.
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Although I urge adoption of a conflict-of-laws rule that would determine the validity of a marriage under the law where the spouses were domiciled at the time of the marriage, 52 I do not believe such a rule is constitutionally compelled. A second state to which the couple moves does have a relevant interest in conferring particular benefits under its own law and can, after measuring its interest as compared to that of the other state, determine whether it is willing to confer the particular benefit. Its own policy against same-sex marriage may be such that it chooses not to privilege the relationship with any economic benefits, or it may decide that it only wants to withhold specific attributes, for example, the right to adopt. 53 The interests of a state in bestowing or not bestowing the incidents of marriage are also acknowledged by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws; comment c to section 284 relating to "incidents of foreign marriage" observes that a "state will not give a particular incident to a foreign marriage when to do so would be contrary to its strong local policy." 54 Of course, the ability of a state to confer or withhold benefits is constitutional only so 48 Id. § 283(2). 49 Id. cmt. j. 50 Section 284, entitled "Incidents of Foreign Marriage," provides: "A state usually gives the same incidents to a foreign marriage, which is valid under the principles stated in § 283, that it gives to a marriage contracted within its territory." Id. § 284. 51 But on the questions of whether same-sex marriage is constitutionally compelled under federal due process and equal protection standards, I have long thought that there is a difference with respect to whether a state should be required to put its "imprimatur" on the relationship by conferring the special and symbolic status of marriage and whether it should have to confer equal economic rights upon the parties. That is, a state might be permitted to withhold its "imprimatur" so long as it allowed couples an available alternative that provided them with similar economic benefits. Such an analysis appears to underlie the legislative action in During one colloquy at the Penn symposium, I was queried about whether the constitutional rights of a child might be infringed if a state to which its parents move is permitted to determine for itself what benefits or rights to confer regarding the parents' relationship. In most situations, the right to a child's relationship with a parent or a right to support from a parent is independent of the marital status of the parents. Whether sexual orientation is a factor that can be taken into account in determining custody is a different question, compare Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding that consideration of race with respect to determination of custody is unconstitutional), but that issue is also separate from the marital status of a same-sex couple. The situation could arise, however, if a state does tie custody to marital status. One example is a custody or visitation order that results from the presumptive rule adopted in many states that when a child is born to a married couple, both of those parties are legal parents. If a nonbiological "parent" in a same-sex union would not be entitled to custody or visitation but for this presumption, it could be said that such a right of custody or visitation is a "right or claim arising from" a "relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage." Under the Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2004), such a judgment would not have to be recognized by a sister state, even if it otherwise would be entitled to recognition and enforcement under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, or one of the Uniform Custody Jurisdiction Acts in effect in all the states.
In one recent case, a same-sex couple residing in Virginia entered into a civil union in Vermont but continued to reside in Virginia for over a year. One of the partners subsequently gave birth to a daughter in Virginia. Three months after the girl's birth, the couple and child moved to Vermont, where they lived for over a year. When the relationship ended, the biological mother returned to Virginia with the child. In a proceeding to dissolve the civil union, a Vermont court, relying on the presumption that both parties of a marriage are legal parents of any child born during the marriage, and equating same-sex union with marriage under Vermont law, recognized a parental interest in both women, and awarded the nonbiological parent visitation. Several conceptual frameworks in conflict of laws support a state's choice to assert its own policies against same-sex marriage at the expense of the interests of the state that permitted such marriage, even when that state was the domicile at the time of marriage. The state whose benefit is now at issue can be said to be furthering its own policy over that of a sister state-a common phenomenon in choice of law analysis. Alternatively, a state has been free to refuse to recognize the validity or incidents of a marriage where such recognition is manifestly incompatible with its public policy. 56 
III. TRANSIENT EFFECTS
A variation on the above scenario involves the situation where the parties marry and continue to reside in a state which allows same-sex marriage. Nonetheless, the interstate activities of the parties may result in the implication of another state's law. For example, an accident in another state might result in the application of that state's wrongful death statute, and the question would be whether the samesex partner qualified as a "spouse" for purposes of that statute. Or the parties may try to avail themselves of a particular benefit, for example, a "spousal" voucher, or the right to exercise decision-making power in the event one partner is disabled. Depending upon the particular right or benefit in question, the state with such a limited nexus to the parties has little interest in what the formal relationship of the couple is. As in the scenario of the "mobile marriage," the forum state should look to the laws of the couple's state of domicile to determine their status, and if the state of domicile would regard the couple as married, 57 it should accord the rights and benefits to the couple that it ther same-sex unions nor rights arising therefrom. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, CH 04-280 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2004). Vermont has since held the biological mother in contempt and both cases are being appealed. 56 See, e.g., Catalano v. Catalano, 170 A.2d 726, 728-29 (Conn. 1961) (finding that the plaintiff was not entitled to a "widow's allowance" as surviving spouse to her uncle (the decedent) because the marriage, though valid in Italy where the parties were living when they were married, contravened the public policy of Connecticut). Compare In re Dalip Singh Bir's Estate, 188 P.2d 499 (Cal. App. 1948), where two wives of a California decedent were permitted to share in the distribution of his estate. The two marriages had legally taken place in Punjab Province, British India, but the decedent had emigrated to California, where he died. The California court observed that public policy considerations would seem to apply "only if [the] decedent had attempted to cohabit with his two wives in California" and not where "only the question of descent of property [was] involved." Id. at 502. 57 That status might result from application of the domiciliary state's own internal rule or its recognition of the marriage under choice of law principles. In effect, a ref-
would to its own domiciliaries. But unlike the situation of the mobile marriage, where the new state of domicile could be said to have a significant interest in whether or not to confer benefits to couples who have come into the state after being domiciled elsewhere, in this case the forum state has only a transient connection with the parties and much less of an interest in furthering its own policies with respect to the incentives that conferring or withholding benefits may have upon the couple's formal relationship. Nonetheless, as a constitutional matter, a state that has a significant enough connection to justify application of its own law would probably have the power to determine the reach of benefits conferred by its own laws.
58
IV. PUBLIC POLICY I turn now to the question of public policy and the effect of the state Defense of Marriage Acts (DOMAs) as an expression of a state's public policy. 59 In cases where the issue is whether a state will confer a particular benefit-whether it be a pension right, a right to recover under a wrongful death statute, or a probate right-reading too much into a mini-DOMA may be a mistake. A prohibition on same-sex marriage-even one expressed in legislation-does not necessarily mean that all economic benefits should be denied. Interestingly, polls have shown that while a substantial majority of the public rejects the idea of same-sex marriage, 60 a narrow majority also believes that same-sex couples should receive equal treatment with respect to economic rights. 61 That societal judgment may play out in different ways when it erence to the law of the domicile here might include adoption of a renvoi. 58 In some situations, that might mean denying benefits even where the couple is treated as married by the state of domicile. In other situations, a state might confer a benefit on a couple because its policy is to honor formal unions even if the state of the parties' domicile would not. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. 59 The Defense of Marriage Acts enacted by a large number of states prohibit same-sex couples from marrying within the state and provide that the state will refuse to recognize marriages between two people of the same sex performed in other states. comes to determining whether same-sex couples may obtain rights and benefits under state laws that prohibit same-sex marriage. In states that prohibit same-sex marriage but offer civil unions, there should be little difference as to whether a party has a right to the particular benefit as a "domestic partner" or as a spouse. However, if there are differences in the scope of those benefits, the more appropriate regime may be that of the domestic partnership. For example, in Germany, the conflict-of-laws rules provide that same-sex partnerships registered outside of Germany will not be given any greater benefits than those given under the German registered domestic partnership law and the German Civil Code.
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On the other hand, in some states where there are mini-DOMAs, domestic partnership benefits are not offered at all. In such cases, a mini-DOMA may be construed to reflect a policy against recognition of any rights or economic benefits flowing from the relationship. Some state DOMAs are even more explicit. For example, Nebraska enacted a constitutional provision that rejects marriage, domestic partnerships, civil unions, or other same-sex relationships, and states that "they shall not be valid or recognized in Nebraska." 63 The Kentucky statute not only states that a marriage between members of the same sex is against Kentucky public policy 64 but a specific provision also voids out-of-state same-sex marriages and provides that any rights granted by virtue of the marriage, or its termination, shall be unenforceable in Kentucky courts. 65 No federal constitutional full faith and credit challenge is availing either-even with respect to a sister-state judgment-since the federal Defense of Marriage Act 66 frees states from any constitutional obligation of judgment recognition. Marriages, of course, have always fallen within the "full faith and credit to laws" standard and have always been subject to a comparison of interests and/or public policy. 67 Professor Tobias Wolff's paper in this Symposium attempts to nuance the reasons that a particular state might refuse to recognize a marriage or confer benefits on a same-sex marriage entered elsewhere, and he argues that some of those reasons might violate constitutional norms. 68 For example, he posits that one reason a state may refuse to recognize same-sex marriage is to dissuade couples from migrating to that state because it does not want same-sex couples residing there. That reason, Professor Wolff contends, is not a constitutionally acceptable basis for refusing to recognize same-sex marriage. Professor Wolff is probably correct about the unconstitutionality of such a purpose, assuming that a state would concede that this were its purpose. But that does not advance the inquiry very far because telling a state that it cannot prevent same-sex couples from taking up residence there is far different from requiring that state to confer benefits under its laws with respect to relationships that it chooses not to privilege. There is a U.S. Supreme Court divorce case that comes to mind in this respect-Simons v. Miami Beach First National Bank 69 -where Florida was permitted to affect the rights of a New York "wife" who was never served with process in an ex parte divorce proceeding in Florida, at least in regard to dower rights conferred by Florida law. The Supreme Court held that the Florida decree could not cut off economic rights of the wife under New York law but the Florida decree could affect rights under Florida law by defining for itself who was a widow. 70 In addition, it should be kept in mind that a state that refuses to confer benefits on these "new" domiciliaries is treating them in the same way that it treats its long-term domiciliaries.
Professor Andrew Koppelman proposes a different approach that a state might take in determining whether the conferral of a particular incident of marriage is consistent with its public policy. He argues that if the parties can contract about such a benefit, then the forum "cannot coherently be said to have a public policy against them enjoy- 71 See Koppelman, Interstate Recognition, supra note 44, at 2158. 72 The Georgia statute provides: (a) It is declared to be the public policy of this state to recognize the union only of man and woman. Marriages between persons of the same sex are prohibited in this state. (b) No marriage between persons of the same sex shall be recognized as entitled to the benefits of marriage. Any marriage entered into by persons of the same sex pursuant to a marriage license issued by another state or foreign jurisdiction or otherwise shall be void in this state. Any contractual rights granted by virtue of such license shall be unenforceable in the courts of this state and the courts of this state shall have no jurisdiction whatsoever under any circumstances to grant a divorce or separate maintenance with respect to such marriage or otherwise to consider or rule on any of the parties' respective rights arising as a result of or in connection with such marriage. See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (1996) . 73 Courts and legislatures have used various doctrines-common-law marriage, putative spouse, and even estoppel-to confer benefits on couples whose marriage was invalid. [Vol. 153: 2195 dence, the Connecticut court observed that since Connecticut "does not recognize the validity of such a union . . . there is no res to address and dissolve." 78 I note that if my own proposal were adopted, Vermont would have lacked prescriptive authority to grant civil unions to nonresidents in a case like Rosengarten. Nonetheless, the problem could still arise in the "mobile marriage" scenario-for example, a Vermont couple who entered into a civil union but later moved to another state. Under my proposed rule, the new state of residence should apply the marriage law of the state of residence/domicile of the parties at the time of the marriage, recognizing that a valid marriage had occurred and accordingly providing a forum for divorce. But because a state that prohibits same-sex marriage will not necessarily adopt that proposed solution, the state that performed the same-sex marriage or civil union should also provide for a dissolution remedy in its statutory scheme.
As for states asked to "recognize" for various purposes a samesex relationship entered into elsewhere, the appropriate choice of law rule for determining the rights and obligations of same-sex couples should also be the law of domicile or residence of the parties at the time of the marriage. Such a rule gives deference to the policies of the state that has the most significant connection to the parties, and is consistent with predictability and party expectations. States with "defense of marriage" acts should not further their own policies at the expense of the legitimate interests of other states and the reasonable expectations of the parties. While they may have the constitutional power to do so, states that choose to prohibit same-sex marriage should not undermine the rights of newly-arriving couples from established marriages in other states that bestowed marital status upon their residents and domiciliaries. In return, states that decide to favor same-sex unions should not try to become the "Nevadas" of same-sex marriage. 
